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)

)
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)
Defendant-Appellant.
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Theresa Marlene Shanholtzer pled guilty to interference in
a child custody agreement.

She received a withheld judgment, and the court placed her on

probation. After a probation violation, the district court sentenced Ms. Shanholtzer to a term of
five years, with two years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. On appeal, Ms. Shanholtzer contends
that the district court abused its discretion by sentencing her excessively and by revoking her
probation.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On the afternoon of September 5, 2018, Theresa Shanholtzer picked up her eleven-yearold son from his foster parent. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),1 p.9.) The
child was in "shelter care" with the Idaho Department of Health & Welfare and was living with a
foster family. (PSI, pp.9, 15.) When the time for the visitation concluded, Ms. Shanholtzer did
not meet the foster parent at the designated time and place to return the child, so law enforcement
was contacted. 2 (PSI, p.9.) Ms. Shanholtzer and her son were quickly located at a motel in
nearby Washington State. (PSI, p.9.) Based on these facts, Ms. Shanholtzer was charged by
information with one count of second degree kidnapping. (R., pp.62-63.)
On October 11, 2018, pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Shanholtzer pled guilty to an
amended information charging her with felony child custody interference. (R., pp.67, 68-69.)
As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend a retained jurisdiction or mental
health court, if accepted. (R., p.67.)
The district court withheld judgment and placed Ms. Shanholtzer on probation for four
years but required her to complete mental health court as a term of probation. (R., pp.84-90.)
Ms. Shanholtzer self-terminated from mental health court, and a report was requested to
determine whether Ms. Shanholtzer was competent to understand the legal proceedings.
(PSI, pp.68-69; Tr., p.3, L.6 - p.4, L.1.)

After receiving a report indicating that she was

competent, the district court took Ms. Shanholtzer's admission to violating one of the terms of

1

Appellant's use of the designation "PSI" includes the packet of documents grouped with the
electronic copy of the PSI, and the page numbers cited shall refer to the corresponding page of
the electronic file.
2
Ms. Shanholtzer did not return her son to the designated meeting place because she mistakenly
believed the foster parent had agreed to allow her autistic son to travel to Portugal. (PSI, p.11.)
She believed that she was protecting him. (PSI, p.11.)
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her probation and proceeded to disposition. 3 (PSI, pp.75-85; Tr., p.4, Ls.1-4; p.8, Ls.9-12.) The
prosecutor recommended a sentence of four years, with two years fixed and that the district court
retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p.9, Ls.7-17.) Defense counsel told the district court that she "pled
[Ms. Shanholtzer] to the felony so she could get into mental health court thinking that that would
help her because I'm aware that misdeme anors don't go into mental health court."
(Tr., p.10, Ls.7-12.) Defense counsel asked the district court to sentence Ms. Shanholtzer to one
year, with six months fixed, and credit for time served. (Tr., p.9, L.19 - p.10, L.4.) The court
sentenced her to a term of five years, with two years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p.10,
Ls.18-25; R., pp.92-100.) After pronouncing the sentence, Judge Mitchell told Ms. Shanholtzer
that the court was upset with her for not cooperating in mental health court:
THE COURT: All right. Well, I am going to impose the following prison
sentence: It's two years fixed, followed by three years indeterminate, total of
five. I'll retain jurisdiction for up to a year. You can decide whether you want to
cooperate or not, and if you don't cooperate, then I'll, in all likelihood, impose
your prison sentence. Do you want me to impose that prison sentence right now?
THE DEFENDANT: Cooperate with what?
THE COURT: Cooperate with their requests, the rules that they have while on
the rider program, and it'd be a great opportunity for you to try to develop some
skills that might make you a good candidate for probation at a later point in time.
I'm specifically finding that you're not a good candidate for probation at this
time, not -- given that you've chosen to not take medications and chose to
discontinue the mental health court program. So I'm happy to impose your prison
sentence and have you go do two years and then go do business with the parole
commission for the next three years, or I'm happy to try a retained jurisdiction,
see if you can get some skills and start understanding the need to comply with the
laws.
The reason I'm imposing a two-year fixed sentence is I view the facts of this case
as being a quite serious incident, and a couple of things by Ms. Payne that were
3

Ms. Shanholtzer initially did not understand what a withheld judgment was, and the district
court took a recess prior to her admission of the probation violation, so that her counsel could
explain that to her. (Tr., p.5, L.13 - p.8, L.8.)
3

said that I don't know that are really accurate. We do have people that are in the
mental health court program from time to time that are misdemeanors. We have
one graduating tomorrow that's a misdemeanor, but the important thing is that on
October 11 th , 2018 you pled guilty to child custody interference as alleged, a
felony, because you crossed -- and one of the elements of that felony is you
crossed state lines, so I think -- I don't think mental health court was a way for
you to avoid this serious crime. I think the mental health court was offered to you
because you truly needed it and have chosen since that time to not take advantage
of that program, so that's the reason for that sentence.
(Tr., p.10, L.18 - p.12, L.8.) On March 18, 2019, Ms. Shanholtzer filed a timely Notice of
Appeal. (R., pp.101-104.)
Ms. Shanholtzer appeals from the judgment of conviction and the order revoking
probation but retaining jurisdiction.

On appeal, Ms. Shanholtzer contends that the district court

abused its discretion in sentencing her excessively and by revoking her probation.

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Ms. Shanholtzer to five years,
with two years fixed, following her plea of guilty to one count of second degree
kidnapping?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. Shanholtzer's probation?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Ms. Shanholtzer To Five Years,
With Two Years Fixed, Following Her Plea Of Guilty To One Count Of Second Degree
Kidnapping
Ms. Shanholtzer asserts that, given any view of the facts, her unified sentence of five
years, with two years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court
imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review
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of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and
the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)). Ms. Shanholtzer does not allege that her sentence exceeds the statutory
maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Ms. Shanholtzer must show

that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the
facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
In light of Ms. Shanholtzer’s rehabilitative potential, the district court abused its
discretion in sentencing her excessively.

The district court failed to consider the fact that

Ms. Shanholtzer was aware of her mental health needs and was taking her prescribed medication
and expressed interest in an evaluation and counseling, and that, with programming,
Ms. Shanholtzer could likely be successful in the community. (PSI, pp.17, 18.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the trial
court to consider a defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho
573, 581 (1999).

Ms. Shanholtzer suffers from major depressive disorder with psychotic

features. (PSI, pp.16-17.) She has also been diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder.
(R., p.82.) She takes medications to manage her mental illness and wants to see a counselor.
(PSI, pp.16-18.) Ms. Shanholtzer is unable to work due to the serious nature of her mental health
condition and has been on disability for twelve years. (PSI, p.23.) At the time of this incident,
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Ms. Shanholtzer was going through menopause and this apparently caused complications with
her mental health condition. (PSI, p.19.) The combination of her physical health issues and her
mental health condition led to this incident in which Ms. Shanholtzer became irrationally upset
and concerned for her son's safety. (PSI, pp.9, 11, 19.) However, Ms. Shanholtzer has since
resumed taking her medication and would like further evaluation and counseling. 4 (PSI, p.17.)
Further, Ms. Shanholtzer expressed remorse for her acts. Ms. Shanholtzer wanted the
court to know that she had both physical and mental health problems when this incident
occurred.

(PSI, pp.18-19.)

She believes that having her medications adjusted would be

beneficial. (PSI, pp.18-19.) Ms. Shanholtzer wanted the court to know that her son was taken by
IDHW one year ago because he had become violent to her. (PSI, p.18.) Ms. Shanholtzer only
contacted law enforcement because nothing else had worked-she had tried to obtain counseling
for him, but that had not happened, nor had joint counseling between the two of them been
scheduled. (PSI, pp.18, 96.) Ms. Shanholtzer does not want to have legal issues with her son or
with the State ofldaho, and wants to be reunified with her son. (PSI, pp.18, 21.) Although she
was told he would only be gone for one month, he has been in foster care for one year.
(PSI, p.18.)

Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant expresses

remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593,
595 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Ms. Shanholtzer asserts that the district court
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon her.
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She asserts that had the

Ms. Shanholtzer told the PSI investigator that she would like a trauma counselor, presumably
because of her childhood experiences; however, she was told by her mental health provider that
her health insurance would not cover it or pay for it. (See PSI, p.18.)
6

district court properly considered her concern for her son, mental health conditions, and remorse,
it would have imposed a less severe sentence.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Ms. Shanholtzer's Probation
Ms. Shanholtzer asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked her
probation and sentenced her to five years, with two years fixed. She asserts that her probation
violations did not justify revoking probation, especially in light of the goals of rehabilitation and
the fact that the protection of society could be best served by her continued supervision under the
probation department.
There are generally two questions that must be determined by the district court in
addressing allegations of probation violations:

first, the court must determine whether the

defendant actually violated the terms and conditions of his probation; and second, if a violation
of probation has been found, the trial court must then decide the appropriate remedy for the
violation.

State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). "The determination of whether a

probation violation has been established is separate from the decision of what consequence, if
any, to impose for the violation." Id. (quoting State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 799 (2004)).
Once a probation violation has been found, the district court must determine whether it is of such
seriousness as to warrant revoking probation. State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App.
2000). However, probation may not be revoked arbitrarily. State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053,
1055 (Ct. App. 1989). The district court must decide whether probation is achieving the goal of
rehabilitation and whether probation is consistent with the protection of society. State v. Leach,
135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001). If a knowing and intentional probation violation has been
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proved, a district court's decision to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.

LC. § 20-222; Leach, 135 Idaho at 529.

In reviewing a trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion, the relevant mqmry
regards four factors:
Whether the trial court: ( 1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).

Only if the trial court determines that alternatives to imprisonment are not adequate in a
particular situation to meet the state's legitimate interest in punishment, deterrence, or the
protection of society, may the court imprison a probationer who has made sufficient, genuine
efforts to obey the terms of the probation order. State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 382 (Ct. App.
1994). Ms. Shanholtzer asserts that the district court abused its discretion by failing to reach its
decision to revoke her probation by the exercise of reason.
Here, Ms. Shanholtzer showed good insight into her mental health issues-she wants to
get better, but she struggled with the side effects of the new medications she was ordered to take
as part of mental health court. (PSI, pp.58, 64, 66, 74.) Ms. Shanholtzer can be rehabilitated and
be a productive member of society.
Ms. Shanholtzer asserts that the district court abused its discretion in finding that her
probation violations justified revocation in light of her rehabilitative potential and her insight
into the issues that initially brought her before the district court. The district court failed to reach
its decision not to place Ms. Shanholtzer back on probation by an exercise of reason, where the
court was angry with Ms. Shanholtzer for being unable to fully comply with the conditions of
mental health court due to her mental illness. (See Tr., p.10, L.18 -p.12, L.8.)
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In light of all of the mitigating evidence that was presented to the district court that
demonstrates Ms. Shanholtzer's significant rehabilitative potential, the district court abused its
discretion when revoked her probation.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Shanholtzer respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, she requests that her case be remanded to the district court for a new
probation violation hearing.
DATED this 23 rd day of August, 2019.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
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KYLIE M. FOURTNER
Administrative Assistant
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